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  A	  comprehensive	  immigration	  reform	  bill	  that	  won	  bipartisan	  support	  the	  U.S.	  Senate	  has	  hit	  a	  contentious	  snag	  in	  the	  U.S.	  House	  of	  Representatives	  that’s	  all	  too	  familiar	  to	  Arizonans:	  border	  security.	  	  	  A	  central	  challenge	  to	  passing	  a	  comprehensive	  immigration	  bill	  remains	  getting	  members	  of	  Congress	  to	  begin	  to	  agree	  on	  what	  a	  “secure”	  border	  with	  Mexico	  even	  looks	  like	  —	  or	  to	  give	  some	  definition	  to	  that	  very	  contested	  term.	  For	  an	  immigration	  reform	  bill	  to	  work,	  majorities	  in	  Congress	  need	  to	  commit	  to	  border-­‐security	  standards	  that	  are	  reasonable	  and	  attainable.	  More	  fundamentally,	  though,	  the	  debate	  on	  border	  security	  needs	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  pitfalls	  that	  have	  made	  agreement	  about	  this	  issue	  so	  difficult.	  Political	  leaders	  need	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  precise	  discussion	  about	  when	  or	  how	  exactly	  the	  border	  can	  be	  considered	  sufficiently	  “secure,”	  which	  has	  not	  been	  determined	  as	  of	  yet.	  	  A	  successful	  immigration	  reform	  bill	  would	  therefore	  represent	  not	  only	  a	  policy	  advancement,	  but	  also	  a	  major	  political	  achievement	  that	  would	  broker	  —	  at	  least	  momentarily	  —	  some	  brand	  of	  consensus	  on	  exactly	  what	  a	  “secure	  border”	  means.	  	  	  As	  anyone	  familiar	  with	  Arizona	  politics	  knows,	  opinions	  diverge	  hugely	  on	  whether	  the	  border	  is	  “secure.”	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  according	  to	  all	  the	  measures	  and	  standards	  that	  have	  usually	  been	  used,	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  border	  has	  been	  more	  secure	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years	  than	  at	  any	  time	  in	  decades.i	  	  	  Given	  this	  fact,	  how	  do	  we	  get	  to	  agreement?	  Defining	  border	  security	  is	  a	  deeply	  charged	  political	  issue.	  But	  amid	  continued,	  broad	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  aims	  comprehensive	  immigration	  reform,ii	  elected	  officials	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  lead	  on	  answering	  what	  exactly	  a	  “secure	  border”	  would	  be.	  If	  the	  border	  is	  to	  be	  secured	  before	  other	  parts	  of	  immigration	  reform	  are	  implemented	  —	  as	  many	  have	  insisted,	  including	  key	  House	  Republicans	  —	  then	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  a	  clear	  discussion	  of	  criteria	  take	  precedence	  in	  a	  debate	  too	  often	  rife	  with	  fuzzy	  claims,	  hazy	  evidence	  and	  shifting	  standards.	  	  	  The	  bill	  that	  passed	  the	  Senate	  with	  a	  bipartisan	  supermajority	  last	  month	  represents	  one	  approach	  to	  laying	  out	  some	  criteria.	  The	  Senate	  bill	  gauges	  border	  security	  through	  two	  measures:	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• For	  setting	  goals,	  the	  bill	  employs	  a	  metric	  called	  the	  “effectiveness	  rate,”	  which	  roughly	  measures	  the	  success	  of	  enforcement	  efforts	  in	  thwarting	  unauthorized	  crossings.	  	  
• For	  setting	  enforcement	  standards,	  there	  are	  “triggers”	  that	  must	  be	  met	  at	  the	  border	  for	  the	  legalization	  portions	  of	  the	  bill	  to	  proceed.	  	  These	  largely	  depend	  on	  enhanced	  technology,	  surveillance	  resources	  and	  manpower	  being	  in	  place	  on	  the	  border.	  	  Even	  with	  the	  huge	  increases	  in	  border	  security	  resources	  provided	  in	  the	  Senate	  bill	  —	  which,	  among	  other	  things,	  would	  more	  than	  double	  the	  Border	  Patrol	  presence	  on	  the	  Southwest	  border	  —	  its	  approach	  will	  be	  revisited	  as	  the	  debate	  moves	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  There,	  the	  chamber’s	  Republican	  leaders	  say	  that	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  a	  floor	  vote,	  a	  bill	  must	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  their	  caucus,	  which	  is	  much	  more	  conservative	  than	  its	  Senate	  counterpart.iii	  	  	  With	  Arizona’s	  Republican	  Senators	  John	  McCain	  and	  Jeff	  Flake	  helping	  to	  lead	  the	  way,	  68	  U.S.	  senators	  agreed	  on	  a	  bipartisan	  bill	  with	  border	  security	  “triggers”	  that	  make	  the	  implementation	  of	  other	  parts	  of	  immigration	  reform	  attainable.	  A	  bill	  emerging	  from	  the	  House	  could	  either	  establish	  feasible	  goals	  or	  demand	  an	  amount	  of	  control	  over	  the	  border	  that	  verges	  on	  impossible.	  As	  some	  House	  leaders	  say	  they	  might	  approach	  immigration	  reform	  through	  a	  piecemeal	  approach	  that	  holds	  border	  security	  as	  their	  top	  priority,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  a	  “secure	  border”	  means	  continues	  to	  stand	  out.	  	  There	  may	  never	  be	  100	  percent	  agreement	  on	  whether	  the	  border	  is	  “secure.”	  But	  if	  reform	  is	  going	  to	  pass	  and	  succeed,	  political	  leaders	  must	  lead	  on	  defining	  standards	  for	  border	  security	  that	  are	  realistic	  —	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  success	  is	  gauged	  and	  what	  actually	  can	  be	  achieved	  on	  a	  1,969-­‐mile-­‐long	  border.	  	  	  	  
Elusive	  Agreement	  on	  a	  “Secure	  Border”	  	  	  The	  measures	  usually	  employed	  to	  measure	  border	  security	  all	  point	  to	  major	  improvements	  in	  the	  past	  decade.	  So	  what	  is	  the	  source	  of	  such	  major	  disagreement	  on	  whether	  the	  border	  is	  “secure?”	  Some	  recent	  assessments	  place	  much	  of	  the	  blame	  for	  this	  disagreement	  on	  the	  federal	  government	  for	  not	  clearly	  defining	  standards	  for	  what	  a	  secure	  border	  means.iv	  	  However,	  the	  most	  fundamental	  problem	  is	  in	  determining	  when	  the	  border	  is	  “secure”	  is	  that	  defining	  “security”	  is	  both	  inherently	  subjective	  and	  highly	  political.	  The	  bureaucratic	  debate	  over	  measurements	  occurs	  on	  top	  of	  a	  more	  fundamental	  political	  debate	  over	  values.	  Whether	  people	  regard	  the	  border	  as	  “secure”	  has	  at	  least	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  gut	  feelings,	  levels	  of	  comfort	  with	  different	  kinds	  of	  risks,	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and	  political	  dynamics	  as	  with	  statistics.	  Take	  three	  major	  phenomena	  in	  the	  recent	  border	  debate:	  	  
Shifting	  areas	  of	  concern	  	  It	  has	  been	  difficult	  to	  settle	  on	  which	  “border	  security”	  problem	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  policy.	  Post-­‐9/11,	  border	  security	  discussions	  were	  dominated	  by	  concerns	  with	  terrorists	  exploiting	  vulnerabilities	  at	  the	  border	  to	  enter	  the	  United	  States.v	  In	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  during	  a	  high	  tide	  in	  unauthorized	  crossings	  into	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  border-­‐security	  debate	  reoriented	  around	  the	  unauthorized	  entry	  of	  labor	  migrants.	  Later,	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  Mexican	  drug	  war	  prompted	  concern	  about	  violence	  potentially	  “spilling	  over”	  into	  the	  United	  States,	  making	  border	  security	  a	  flashpoint	  again	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  illegal	  crossings	  were	  clearly	  declining.	  Today	  in	  Congress,	  the	  major	  border-­‐security	  concern	  seems	  again	  to	  be	  the	  number	  of	  unauthorized	  crossers	  that	  can	  be	  apprehended.	  	  
Anecdotal	  evidence	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  objectivity	  in	  public	  discussion	  of	  border	  security,	  since	  anecdotes	  easily	  gain	  traction	  against	  broader	  statistical	  arguments.	  A	  notable	  example	  is	  the	  2010	  shooting	  death	  of	  southern	  Arizona	  rancher	  Robert	  Krentz,	  which	  rocked	  Arizona	  border	  politicsvi	  even	  though	  overall	  violent	  crime	  rates	  in	  border	  communities	  at	  the	  time	  were	  relatively	  low.vii	  	  
Relative	  goals	  There	  is	  simply	  a	  lot	  of	  relativity	  in	  what	  people	  consider	  “enough”	  security.	  To	  some,	  the	  border	  may	  be	  more	  secure	  now	  than	  before,	  but	  levels	  of	  unauthorized	  crossing	  may	  still	  be	  far	  too	  high	  to	  call	  the	  border	  “secure.”	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  pressing	  question	  of	  how	  much	  enforcement	  has	  to	  exist	  before	  it	  is	  considered	  enough.	  Some	  hard-­‐line	  opponents	  of	  immigration	  reform	  seem	  to	  put	  the	  number	  of	  acceptable	  crossings	  at	  zero,	  while	  also	  calling	  for	  further	  increases	  to	  deportations,	  which	  already	  have	  reached	  record	  highs.viii	  	  	  
Creating	  Consensus	  on	  What’s	  “Secure	  Enough”	  As	  reform	  proponents	  realize,	  the	  ambiguity	  in	  defining	  a	  “secure	  border”	  could	  potentially	  be	  used	  by	  opponents	  to	  delay	  immigration	  reform	  indefinitely.	  Thus	  a	  successful	  immigration	  reform	  bill	  must	  forestall	  the	  tendency	  toward	  shifting	  standards	  and	  anecdotal	  or	  non-­‐objective	  evidence	  in	  the	  border-­‐security	  discussion.	  Majorities	  in	  Congress	  instead	  must	  find	  a	  way	  to	  agree	  on	  objective	  standards	  for	  determining	  the	  border	  as	  sufficiently	  secure.	  	  	  Policy-­‐wise,	  this	  effort	  has	  been	  translated	  into	  the	  enforcement	  “triggers”ix	  that	  have	  been	  a	  major	  topic	  of	  discussion	  in	  Congress.	  These	  triggers	  would	  determine	  when	  there	  has	  been	  enough	  progress	  in	  securing	  the	  border	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  immigration	  bill,	  especially	  the	  granting	  of	  permanent	  legal	  status	  to	  the	  current	  unauthorized	  population.	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  In	  recent	  years,	  “securing	  the	  border	  first”	  has	  been	  a	  litmus	  test	  by	  many	  Republicans	  for	  supporting	  reform.x	  However,	  there	  has	  never	  been	  a	  lasting	  or	  specific	  consensus	  on	  what	  has	  to	  be	  done	  to	  meet	  this	  demand	  definitively.	  The	  “secure	  the	  border	  first”	  stance	  rose	  in	  popularity	  after	  conservative	  opposition	  helped	  scuttle	  Congress’	  last	  major	  immigration	  reform	  push	  in	  2007.	  Some	  Republicans	  who	  had	  generally	  supported	  the	  effort	  (including	  both	  McCainxi	  and	  Flakexii)	  changed	  their	  positions	  to	  say	  overall	  reform	  should	  happen	  only	  after	  the	  border	  had	  been	  secured.	  While	  the	  border-­‐security	  goals	  laid	  out	  to	  be	  accomplished	  by	  the	  2007	  legislation	  were	  largely	  achieved	  by	  2010,xiii	  many	  continue	  to	  hold	  this	  position	  and	  maintain	  the	  border	  is	  not	  secure	  enough.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  single	  objective	  meaning	  for	  “border	  security,”	  the	  political	  bargain	  on	  immigration	  reform	  depends	  on	  enough	  political	  leaders	  agreeing	  to	  leave	  behind	  shifting	  or	  shapeless	  definitions,	  and	  instead	  deciding	  on	  workable	  standards	  to	  write	  into	  law.	  Such	  standards	  must	  address	  particular	  concerns	  of	  lawmakers	  and	  the	  public,	  as	  well	  as	  command	  confidence	  by	  being	  based	  on	  data	  and	  evidence.	  And,	  crucially,	  they	  must	  actually	  be	  attainable.	  
	  
	  
Setting	  Attainable	  Goals:	  Problems	  with	  Past	  Measures	  	  	  As	  the	  House	  begins	  to	  take	  up	  the	  issue,	  what	  measurements	  could	  policymakers	  look	  to	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  forge	  consensus?	  By	  all	  the	  measures	  that	  typically	  have	  been	  used	  to	  gauge	  border	  security,	  the	  fact	  is	  the	  border	  is	  more	  secure	  today	  and	  in	  recent	  years	  than	  it	  had	  been	  in	  the	  previous	  four	  decades.	  Still,	  none	  of	  those	  measures	  are	  particularly	  effective	  at	  determining	  whether	  the	  security	  issues	  that	  our	  political	  system	  focuses	  on	  are	  actually	  being	  addressed.xiv	  	  	  
 Border	  Patrol	  apprehensions	  —	  The	  most	  commonly	  cited	  border-­‐security	  statistic	  is	  probably	  the	  number	  of	  Border	  Patrol	  apprehensions	  of	  people	  crossing	  without	  authorization	  between	  ports	  of	  entry	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  border.	  This	  figure	  is	  broadly	  accepted	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  overall	  levels	  of	  unauthorized	  crossings	  —	  where	  more	  apprehensions	  represent	  increased	  overall	  traffic,	  and	  fewer	  represent	  reduced	  traffic	  —	  though	  it	  is	  a	  very	  rough	  proxy	  that	  is	  problematic	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  enforcement	  success.xv	  Obviously,	  apprehensions	  do	  not	  measure	  what	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  most	  pertinent	  statistic:	  how	  many	  people	  manage	  to	  cross	  successfully	  into	  the	  U.S.	  without	  authorization.xvi	  
	  
 Seizures	  of	  illicit	  substances	  —	  Various	  government	  agencies	  have	  reported	  on	  seizures	  of	  drugs,	  money	  and	  weapons	  at	  the	  border.	  However,	  seizure	  numbers	  do	  not	  make	  clear	  what	  proportions	  of	  these	  illegal	  flows	  are	  being	  intercepted.	  It	  is	  also	  unclear	  that	  attempting	  to	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intercept	  these	  flows	  at	  the	  border,	  rather	  than	  at	  other	  places	  in	  the	  smuggling	  chain,	  is	  most	  effective.xvii	  	  
 Crime	  levels	  in	  border	  communities	  —	  Addressing	  fears	  about	  “spillover	  violence,”	  authorities	  have	  sometimes	  pointed	  to	  crime	  rates	  in	  U.S.	  border	  jurisdictions.	  Overall	  they	  show	  relatively	  low	  and	  flat	  violent	  crime	  rates.xviii	  However,	  some	  analysts	  say	  it	  is	  difficult	  using	  existing	  data	  to	  assess	  trends	  in	  border-­‐related	  crime	  specifically.xix	  Others	  note	  a	  divide	  between	  U.S.	  border	  cities,	  where	  crime	  rates	  are	  low,	  and	  rural	  areas	  where	  the	  perception	  of	  danger	  is	  higher.xx	  Regardless,	  analysis	  of	  border-­‐related	  crime	  cannot	  answer	  questions	  about	  unauthorized	  crossers	  who	  enter	  without	  committing	  violent	  crimes.	  	  
	  
 Inputs:	  Manpower,	  technology,	  spending	  —	  How	  many	  resources	  the	  federal	  government	  has	  put	  into	  border	  security	  is	  often	  cited	  in	  discussions.	  These	  numbers	  already	  have	  risen	  hugely.xxi	  Input	  statistics	  may	  tell	  some	  of	  the	  story,	  but	  they	  clearly	  do	  not	  measure	  the	  success	  of	  enforcement.	  Research	  has	  not	  even	  precisely	  determined	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  border	  enforcement	  actually	  works	  at	  preventing	  unauthorized	  entries.	  Enforcement	  is	  far	  from	  the	  only	  factor	  determining	  the	  flow	  of	  migration:	  The	  wage	  gap	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  countries	  of	  origin,	  the	  supply	  of	  possible	  migrants	  in	  sending	  countries,	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  immigrant	  networks	  in	  the	  U.S.	  are	  also	  very	  important	  in	  determining	  these	  flows,	  so	  resources	  alone	  do	  not	  determine	  success.xxii	  	  	  
Dual	  Focus:	  Inputs	  and	  the	  
“Effectiveness	  Rate”	  	  Notwithstanding,	  the	  bill	  that	  passed	  the	  Senate	  continues	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  resources	  on	  the	  border	  as	  a	  main	  criterion	  of	  success.	  An	  amendment	  by	  Senators	  Bob	  Corker,	  R-­‐Tenn.,	  and	  John	  Hoeven,	  R-­‐N.D.,	  ensured	  the	  bill	  mandates	  specific	  technological	  capabilities	  be	  in	  place	  in	  each	  border	  sector,	  requires	  “persistent	  surveillance”	  across	  the	  border,	  and	  provides	  that	  20,000	  additional	  Border	  Patrol	  agents	  be	  hired	  and	  stationed	  on	  the	  southwest	  border,	  more	  than	  doubling	  the	  Border	  Patrol	  presence	  there.	  
Two versions of “effectiveness” 
	  
	  	  
	  Senate-passed bill  
• 90% effectiveness 
rate is a goal in all 




• DHS plans must 
include specified 
resource increases 
• Triggers met if this 
plan (including new 
resources) is 
operational  
Cornyn hard triggers 
 
• 90% effectiveness 
rate required in all 
SW border sectors 
• “Full situational 
awareness” across 
border required 
• DHS must submit 
security plans 
• Effectiveness goal 
must be met 
continuously in 12 
months preceding 
legalization  
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  The	  Senate	  bill’s	  other	  critical	  metric	  is	  a	  previously	  little-­‐discussed	  statistic	  called	  the	  “effectiveness	  rate,”	  which	  attempts	  to	  measure	  the	  portion	  of	  people	  who	  cross	  unauthorized	  between	  ports	  of	  entry	  and	  fail.	  The	  rate	  is	  the	  number	  of	  apprehensions	  plus	  the	  number	  of	  “turnbacks,”	  divided	  by	  the	  total	  number	  of	  attempted	  crossings.	  	  This	  measure	  has	  its	  problems,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  discussed	  below.xxiii	  Still,	  the	  effectiveness	  rate	  conceptually	  makes	  more	  sense	  than	  many	  previous	  standards	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  success.	  	  The	  bill	  that	  passed	  the	  Senate	  establishes	  a	  90	  percent	  effectiveness	  rate	  as	  the	  goal	  in	  all	  sectors	  of	  the	  southwestern	  border.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  require	  that	  this	  be	  met	  as	  a	  “trigger,”	  instead	  establishing	  resource	  levels	  as	  the	  primary	  triggers	  to	  proceed	  with	  legalization.xxiv	  This	  debate	  over	  “hard”	  or	  “soft”	  triggers	  —	  raised	  in	  the	  Senate	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  failed	  amendment	  by	  Senator	  John	  Cornyn,	  R-­‐Texas	  —	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  resurrected	  in	  the	  House,	  with	  many	  Republicans	  demanding	  what	  they	  view	  as	  more	  accountability	  in	  meeting	  border	  security	  standards.	  	  	  Depending	  on	  how	  it	  is	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  House,	  a	  90	  percent	  “effectiveness	  rate”	  could	  either	  represent	  a	  high-­‐but-­‐realistic	  security	  goal	  or	  a	  nearly	  insurmountable	  obstacle	  to	  the	  legislation’s	  legalization	  programs.xxv	  Some	  members	  of	  the	  House	  have	  indicated	  that	  they	  may	  also	  move	  forward	  with	  piecemeal	  legislation	  that	  addresses	  border	  security,	  leaving	  proposals	  to	  legalize	  most	  of	  the	  current	  unauthorized	  population	  for	  later.	  Still,	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  goals	  of	  border-­‐security	  measures	  should	  be	  defined	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  judged	  whether	  the	  provisions	  have	  sufficiently	  worked.	  	  The	  most	  important	  difference	  between	  varying	  versions	  of	  the	  “effectiveness	  rate”	  proposals	  is	  how	  strictly	  they	  require	  the	  standard	  to	  be	  met	  before	  action	  occurs	  in	  other	  policy	  areas.	  The	  Senate	  bill	  considers	  its	  security	  provisions	  satisfied	  if	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security’s	  plan	  to	  meet	  90	  percent	  effectiveness,	  including	  mandated	  resource	  and	  staffing	  increases,	  is	  certified	  as	  “operational.”	  If	  DHS	  has	  trouble	  meeting	  this	  goal,	  a	  border	  security	  commission	  with	  border-­‐state	  representatives	  is	  empanelled	  to	  help	  guide	  DHS	  in	  meeting	  the	  goals.	  	  	  A	  “hard	  trigger”	  version	  is	  very	  different.	  The	  “hard	  triggers”	  version	  proposed	  by	  Cornyn	  requires	  that	  the	  90	  percent	  effectiveness	  rate	  —	  	  and	  100	  percent	  situational	  awareness,	  or	  basically	  unbroken	  surveillance	  —	  be	  achieved	  continually	  for	  the	  12-­‐month	  period	  preceding	  legalization.	  Relatively	  small	  lapses,	  including	  a	  minor	  slippage	  in	  a	  low-­‐traffic	  sector	  for	  a	  week	  or	  a	  month,	  could	  delay	  the	  implementation	  of	  legalization	  measures.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  that	  any	  “hard”	  version	  of	  the	  triggers	  risks	  creating.	  	  
How	  many	  have	  “gotten	  away?”	  Reliance	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  rate	  has	  a	  clear	  basic	  problem:	  It	  means	  estimating	  the	  amount	  of	  unauthorized	  border-­‐crossers	  who	  have	  gotten	  away.	  Obviously,	  some	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would	  cross	  without	  being	  detected.	  The	  Border	  Patrol	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  kept	  track	  of	  estimated	  “turnbacks”	  and	  “gotaways,”	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  number	  of	  apprehensions.	  Together,	  this	  is	  called	  “known	  flow”	  data.	  Using	  the	  most	  recently	  released	  complete	  “known	  flow”	  data	  —	  for	  federal	  Fiscal	  Year	  2011	  —	  shows	  the	  following	  trends	  across	  Border	  Patrol	  sectors:	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Overall,	  the	  “effectiveness	  rate”	  based	  on	  known	  flow	  data	  has	  improved	  considerably	  in	  recent	  years.	  Under	  a	  “hard	  triggers”	  plan,	  the	  effectiveness	  rate	  would	  require	  further	  significant	  improvement	  based	  on	  the	  known	  flow	  data	  in	  a	  large	  number	  of	  sectors,	  as	  shown	  below	  in	  border	  effectiveness	  rates	  by	  individual	  sector:	  	  	  
 FY 2006  FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 
 
San Diego 
80.47%  75.45% 81.98% 86.77% 89.72% 91.86% 
El Centro 
82.76%  84.76% 83.52% 87.69% 88.75% 90.54% 
Yuma 
63.81%  78.69% 87.60% 91.85% 94.81% 93.74% 
Tucson 
66.93%  63.91% 67.92% 71.30% 77.79% 86.87% 
El Paso 
72.93%  86.80% 92.68% 94.38% 95.72% 94.63% 
Big Bend 
86.07%  87.58% 81.34% 73.45% 73.01% 67.97% 
Del Rio 
62.97%  68.64% 72.76% 81.79% 85.92% 86.46% 
Laredo 
70.24%  64.47% 77.72% 83.82% 86.76% 83.95% 
Rio Grande 
Valley 55.44%  52.60% 57.28% 60.59% 63.30% 70.84% 
Total 69.11%  69.73% 72.91% 76.19% 79.35% 83.71% 
0%	  10%	  20%	  
30%	  40%	  50%	  
60%	  70%	  80%	  
90%	  
FY	  2006	   FY	  2007	   FY	  2008	   FY	  2009	   FY	  2010	   FY	  2011	  
Border	  Security	  Total	  Effectiveness	  
Rate	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Known	  flow	  data	  very	  likely	  underestimate	  the	  amount	  of	  crossers	  who	  have	  gotten	  away.	  Most	  Border	  Patrol	  estimates	  of	  “gotaways”	  are	  made	  from	  agents	  finding	  physical	  evidence	  of	  successful	  crossers	  after	  the	  fact,	  in	  a	  method	  called	  “sign-­‐cutting.”xxvi	  Sign-­‐cutting	  is	  not	  an	  exact	  science,	  though	  the	  Border	  Patrol	  says	  its	  methods	  are	  improving.xxvii	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  much	  increased	  surveillance	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  bill	  might	  improve	  the	  accuracy	  of	  these	  estimates.xxviii	  Other	  sources	  of	  data	  —	  particularly	  surveys	  of	  migrants	  —	  suggest	  that	  the	  number	  of	  unauthorized	  migrants	  who	  successfully	  cross	  may	  be	  about	  50	  percent	  higher	  than	  known-­‐flow	  data	  reflect.xxix	  The	  failed	  “hard	  triggers”	  amendment	  in	  the	  Senate	  required	  that	  the	  Border	  Patrol	  consider	  alternate	  methodologies	  in	  assessing	  its	  effectiveness	  rate,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  they	  would	  be	  factored	  in.xxx	  Depending	  on	  how	  they	  are,	  the	  triggers	  could	  be	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  satisfy.	  	  
Resources	  as	  a	  trigger?	  As	  discussed,	  measuring	  resources	  in	  place	  at	  the	  border	  does	  not	  measure	  the	  results	  of	  those	  enforcement	  activities.	  Therefore	  some	  may	  consider	  a	  bill	  like	  the	  one	  that	  passed	  the	  Senate,	  which	  uses	  resources	  as	  a	  major	  measurement	  of	  security,	  to	  be	  a	  step	  back.	  A	  “hard	  triggers”	  bill	  would	  likely	  abandon	  this	  or	  supplement	  it	  with	  a	  specific	  requirement	  for	  meeting	  an	  “effectiveness	  rate.”	  	  	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  note	  that	  migration	  flows	  occur	  due	  to	  a	  wide	  number	  of	  factors,	  other	  than	  enforcement,	  over	  which	  the	  U.S.	  government	  has	  very	  little	  control,	  including	  economic	  factors	  in	  “sending”	  countries.	  Therefore	  some	  may	  view	  resources	  as	  a	  safer	  kind	  of	  trigger	  that	  does	  not	  subject	  the	  implementation	  of	  reform	  to	  unforeseeable	  developments	  in	  migration	  flows	  that	  may	  affect	  “effectiveness”	  rates.	  	  This	  is	  why	  provisions	  increasing	  resources	  have	  been	  included	  without	  much	  protest	  by	  pro-­‐reform	  legislators.	  While	  it	  is	  arguable	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  measures	  may	  improve	  security,	  as	  “triggers,”	  they	  are	  rather	  clearly	  attainable.	  Still,	  it	  is	  completely	  worth	  questioning	  what	  further	  resource	  increases,	  including	  a	  redoubling	  of	  the	  Border	  Patrol,	  stand	  to	  deliver	  in	  terms	  of	  enforcement	  results.	  Research	  on	  the	  overall	  effectiveness	  of	  border	  enforcement	  is	  relatively	  scant,	  and	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  at	  some	  point	  increased	  enforcement,	  which	  carries	  a	  significant	  price	  tag,xxxi	  will	  yield	  diminishing	  marginal	  returns.xxxii	  	  
	  
Implications	  for	  the	  Policy	  Debate	  Ambiguity	  in	  defining	  “border	  security,”	  shortfalls	  in	  the	  ways	  proposed	  to	  measure	  it,	  and	  the	  political	  and	  policy	  realities	  of	  reform	  suggest	  a	  number	  of	  implications	  as	  the	  House	  takes	  up	  the	  immigration	  issue:	  	  
 Getting	  real	  about	  defining	  a	  “secure	  border”	  Politicians	  should	  be	  reasonably	  specific	  about	  what	  border	  security	  standards	  they	  want	  to	  see	  before	  the	  border	  can	  be	  considered	  “secure	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enough,”	  so	  that	  the	  public	  can	  evaluate	  those	  demands.	  Those	  unwilling	  to	  specify	  only	  add	  delay	  —	  perhaps	  intentionally	  —	  to	  any	  immigration	  reform.	  Arizona	  politicians	  especially	  have	  dealt	  with	  border	  issues	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  and	  by	  now	  should	  be	  prepared	  to	  clearly	  state	  what	  they	  would	  consider	  a	  secure	  “enough”	  border	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  new	  and	  lasting	  legislation.	  	  
 Balancing	  accountability	  and	  realism	  Holding	  the	  government	  accountable	  for	  security	  outcomes	  is	  a	  reasonable	  priority.	  Border	  policy,	  however,	  should	  recognize	  that	  government	  enforcement	  alone	  isn’t	  what	  determines	  cross-­‐border	  flows.	  Especially	  as	  the	  economy	  improves,	  increases	  in	  unauthorized	  crossings	  may	  reflect	  new	  enforcement	  circumstances,	  rather	  than	  enforcement	  failures.	  Border-­‐security	  goals	  must	  reflect	  this	  reality.	  Employing	  an	  “effectiveness	  rate”	  could	  help	  to	  address	  this	  problem	  or	  could	  be	  a	  major	  hindrance	  to	  progress,	  depending	  on	  how	  legislators	  act	  and	  react.	  	  
 Balancing	  clarity	  and	  flexibility	  The	  desire	  for	  standards	  to	  be	  clear	  and	  definite	  is	  well	  placed.	  But	  requiring	  that	  enforcement	  results	  meet	  very	  precise	  requirements	  risks	  hinging	  the	  implementation	  of	  important	  policies	  on	  standards	  that	  could	  very	  costly	  or	  unreachable.	  They	  could	  even	  scuttle	  implementation	  outright	  because	  of	  shortcomings	  that	  are	  relatively	  minor.	  Congress	  would	  be	  wise	  to	  make	  sure	  its	  goals	  are	  feasible,	  that	  meeting	  goals	  will	  not	  be	  hung	  up	  on	  minor	  shortfalls,	  and	  that	  funding	  to	  support	  these	  goals	  is	  sufficient	  on	  an	  ongoing	  basis.	  Otherwise,	  the	  bill	  could	  be	  undermined.	  	  
 A	  never-­ending	  debate	  Because	  defining	  security	  is	  inherently	  subjective,	  no	  one	  should	  expect	  debate	  on	  whether	  the	  border	  is	  secure	  to	  end	  any	  time	  soon.	  The	  political	  goal	  for	  immigration	  reform	  should	  be	  more	  modest:	  a	  practical	  commitment	  on	  how	  —	  right	  now	  and	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  bill	  moving	  forward	  —	  “secure	  enough”	  can	  be	  defined.	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